One critique that’s been consistently leveled at China’s stimulus plan in particular, and the prospects for Chinese growth in general, is that China will essentially be forced to build ‘bridges to nowhere’ to provide jobs for surly laborers. This is certainly possible – at the same time, it seems so easy to find profitable projects – much of China is still without reliable electricity and running water. Does the composition of existing infrastructure make it more likely that they will avoid more non-performing loans? This situation also influences the oft-discussed phenomena of high Chinese household savings rates, even outside of a reliable social safety net (of course Zhou everyman is going to avoid buying a washing machine if he can’t plug it in regardless of whatever newfangled subsidy the provincial bosses have rolled out). It’s an important empirical question; and one that I don’t have the data to begin to address.

As a result, to the extent that stimulus economics might work, it would seem to have a much better chance in target-rich China than in places like the U.S. or France, where some of the stimulus funds are being used for… Cathedral facade renovation [intellectually dishonest example - here's a better one: road / school maintenance is bound to be less remunerative than building roads and schools where there were none before?]