The amount of attention that’s gone towards Rmb revaluation in the last several days seems out of place, if only because gradual appreciation of the currency appears obvious and inevitable given that numerous agencies and bureaus are putting in place machinery to deal with its impacts, such as SAFE diversifying away from USD exposure as much as possible or Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges moving towards international Rmb denominated listings, which will eventually require free(er) capital flows.

Rmb appreciation will not materially affect the U.S. trade deficit, and it will have questionable near-term impacts on imbalances. As Chinese gain more purchasing power, they will likely do things like leave the lights on after 5:00pm (and consume more coal and oil as a result), pushing up energy prices. Americans will then (broadly) be forced to pay more to drive their hummers and power their plasma televisions, increasing the United States’ total import bill. Furthermore, there will likely be some level of input-import substitution occurring within China itself, if mainland manufacturers find that they can suddenly purchase other components more cheaply. Threatening sanctions to hasten this process – for dubious gain – is nationalist stupidity at its most pure.

For what’s at stake among various interest groups within China, we turn to the eminent Professor Pettis:

A revaluation shifts wealth from the Chinese government and the manufacturing sectors (and some wealthy Chinese) to Chinese households — which, by the way, is pretty much what is meant by “rebalancing” in the Chinese context. There are many other ways besides revaluation to shift income this way. The PBoC can raise deposit rates, wages can rise faster than productivity, companies can be privatized by giving away shares to the pubic, and so on. They all have the same effect. They shift resources to households and away from producers, infrastructure investment, and real estate developers. This allows household income to grow relative to national income, which ultimately increases the consumption share of GDP.

Domestic Chinese exporters don’t have a leg to stand on for a weak Rmb peg, at present. That doesn’t mean they aren’t lobbying for it, though. To the extent they will be able to sell an us vs. them narrative, anti-China sanctions will only provide more ammunition to make the case for more domestic subsidies, be they explicit (tax breaks) or implicit (currency).