What happens next is a microcosm of the curious sort of schizophrenia that seems to dictate attitudes towards sex on the mainland. The seven or so people that engage the fFSW proceed to calmly explainproselytize how she can ‘change her life by going to school, and she doesn’t need to feel guilty or ashamed.’ The 40 some other students rush up to the demonstration table, and giggle away with condoms and eggplants (remind, these are 25-30 year old med students. See here for more on this topic).

Sex workers are ubiquitous in China. Most are migrant workers who show up in a city and rapidly discover they aren’t able to earn very much money, which is an issue if there are parental dependencies (medical debts, I am told, are a common reason). Others just want to earn more. Again, I’ve heard varying figures – anywhere from Rmb2,000 to Rmb30,000 per month – with a significant skew towards the lower end of the distribution.

The schizophrenia referred to earlier: near total omission of the topic within public discourse, combined with a tacit acceptance that, for the most part, patronizing FSWs is entirely defensible, a normal recreation activity. Again, I realize this double standard occurs everywhere, but the extent of it is astounding, and it even seems to rub off on expats living here as it’s not uncommon to hear gringos in similar positions to mine relate tales of late-nights spent with a pretty KTV小姐. My sense is that these same individuals would never think of entertaining similar engagements in their home environments, and that local norms are used to justify to oneself otherwise aberrant behavior. Whether this is some form of groupthink, or merely a convenient excuse for previously taboo desires remains unclear. There’s probably some cognitive bait-and-switch that allows internal absolution because it’s accepted (or in some cases, expected) behavior.

The omnipresence of the underlying attitudes necessitate the entire SW complex (with all of its less slightly-less visible support functions as well: neighborhood abortion clinics for avoidable pregnancies; or the downright disgusting ancillary activities: numerous advertisements for hymen replacement surgery so that SWs can charge more). All of this has led to a growing HIV problem among China’s migrants, one of the populations most vulnerable to medical problems given a fractured health insurance system. Even here there are calls to normalize / legalize the trade in order to better monitor these risks, and stop the most egregious violations of human decency.

I’m less convinced now (after having interacted with a Women’s Rights Workshop in Wuhan) that legalization is a general panacea for rights issues that result from prostitution, though it might help mitigate the negative aspects of certain types of coercion. The most extreme stories involve rural mafiasos kidnapping women and raping them, then using that as blackmail to force them into sex work, and legalization might serve as a deterrent if some of these criminals are then able to be prosecuted. As it stands most FSWs are unwilling to come forward, given that they may very well be arrested themselves. Legalization doesn’t seem to do much in the way of mitigating monetary coercion, however, and serves potentially serve to institutionalize the double standards that make the whole enterprise possible?

Regardless, China at present has the worst of both worlds: a staunchly illegal official stance combined with near-total tacit acceptance, legally and socially, leading to things like egregious show-raids that are rights violations in and of themselves. The medical system is largely biased against FSWs; though to their credit numerous municipal governments do offer subsidized medical checks. NGOs like the one in Wuhan are working to help people forced into these situations.

It’s not our system to judge or change, but there is a choice of how to interact with it. Given the amount of attention received when traveling as single white male, it seems reasonable to assume that foreigners (in Shanghai anyway) account for an unrepresentative percentage of the “higher end” market, though are probably miniscule as a portion of the total amount. Relative impact in this context shouldn’t absolve responsibility, though at the margin the most foreigners living here can probably do is to refrain from using such services, helping organizations that are concerned with women’s rights in China, where possible… and ridicule the narcissistic expat parasites who do partake, couched in some sort of rationalization that complex cultural norms legitimize flexible morality.

Peng Gaofeng was busy with customers when a man snatched his 4-year-old son from the plaza in front of his shop as throngs of factory workers enjoyed a spring evening. “I turned away for a minute, and when I called out for him he was gone,” Mr. Peng said.

Evidence from interviews conducted here suggests that these cases are almost always migrant children – primarily because their parents are too busy working 14 hours a day, 7 days a week; and they have not been [brainwashed] with basic safety knowledge. Thinking back to how many times my parents drilled “look both ways, memorize your phone number, you will begin practicing swimming when you are six months old” I begin to see how ubiquitous this is in Western culture. Urban Chinese are not dissimilar, though probably take more risks with their children than would your average American.

It’s not that migrants don’t care about their children – they certainly do – but rural lifestyle perhaps doesn’t inculcate these same values. As one person explained: “In the countryside, we know everyone. They watch out for our kids. There’s no traffic there. There’s nowhere to swim. A lot of people just don’t think it’s going to be different in the city.”

Another interesting phenomenon relating to youth culture is the extent to which concerns about internet addiction are present in common discourse. Tricia Wang, a PhD student at UCSD, hypothesizes that internet cafes can serve as a form of child care for the aforementioned migrant parents with too little free time:

I suspect that internet cafes are a form of an after-school program for the kids – the parents feel comfortable knowing that they are in one place. I also suspect that the youth do not know how to use the internet for educational purposes – or more so are their educational resources in China for students? Must find that out.

This makes sense. So why are the other half of urban parents deathly afraid of internet addiction that they will send their children to ‘recovery camps’ that utilize electro-therapy? (“I just want to check my email *buzz* no wait I need to level a little in WoW *buzz* please I just want to update my status!” *buzz buzz buzz* – actually the electrotherapy was recently banned. Still. Seriously.) So why don’t people in the U.S. talk about internet addiction? I’m pretty sure that if you took away the laptop, in about six hours flat, I’d be writhing on the floor clutching at phantom keys in a desperate attempt to imagine my way back into connectivity. If that doesn’t count as addiction, not sure what does.

Jin Ge, a videographer from Shanghai who profiled WoW goldfarming explained to me that: “For parents with the time and money, they are worried about every sort of behavioral ‘defect’ their child might have. The common conception here is that these things can be ‘cured’ with things like electrotherapy. There might be internet addiction in the U.S., but parents think differently about it / deal with it differently.”

Additionally, many Chinese internet users will spent a lot of time in public internet cafes, whereas the majority of Americans, I would assume, are comfortably “addicted” on a personal computer in their parent’s basement. University students will often just sleep in the internet cafe, since most dormitories have curfews of around 11:00 / 12:00. As a result, a lot of these behaviors are more observable, especially the all-nighters and subsequent zombie flash mob-esque walks of shame back into campus.

There also seems to be some credibility to the notion that escapism is more attractive here due to greater amounts of alienation. Again, to use a tired U.S. / China comparison, I found myself being beginning to live independent of my parents at 17/18, whereas your average Chinese student will be wholly dependent until they are 22/23 – this seemed fine until a classmate (this guy is 21 years old) said that he still “sleeps with his parents when I go home on vacation because it makes me feel safe.” Your average upwardly mobile Chinese youngster also goes from being an only child, and then thrust into a university setting where s/he has 7 roommates. The feeling of being alone – even surrounded by others in an internet cafe – is probably a very powerful draw for these students.

Regardless, these issues warrant more exploration and attention – especially the promotion of basic safety knowledge among migrant children (that seems like a very low cost high return type activity), and providing constructive (or at least non-destructive?) extra-curricular activities for migrant children.

Recently, I’ve started doing these interviews in earnest again. Previously, I had been giving out bottles of water, and / or small payments to compensate people for their time. Instead I now use: cigarettes. Though always aware of the ubiquitous nature cigarettes play in social interactions (among men), I had avoided using them due to some ingrained yuppie aversion to the negative health effects of smoking. I should have been using them all along – they open people up very quickly – or rather, put people at ease, and make the conversation seem much more natural. So, if you’re doing any sort of social research in China, always carry cigarettes around, and give them out liberally.

Thinking more generally about China, recently, the longer I stay here the more I realize how inaccessible ‘China’ as an entity is purely due to its size. China’s floating population is larger than most national populations. Heck, China’s total population’s margin of error is larger than most national populations. China’s recent experience, in the last several decades, is so unique that it’s impossible to find any simplifying historical analogies that do justice to the complexity of reality.

So, how to address it, from either a professional or academic perspective? Limit your question(s), either in terms of scope or geography. Even the most insignificant issue will rapidly balloon into something inaccessible. This was a mistake I made at the beginning, and have only recently begun to refine.

One of the biggest problem that faces migrants everywhere in China is that of delayed or unpaid wages. Either as a result rapacious bosses, or problems with payment systems (for example, it is common for construction projects to begin before complete financing has been secured), many migrants have at one time or another been faced with illegally garnished or held wages.  This has been as much a problem of enforceable contracts (often employees simply weren’t given any – I’m told the situation has improved) and with the knowledge of, and means to proper legal recourse.

Hangzhou is notable among mid/small cities in China in being fairly proactive towards issues of migrant labor. Here’s an unsurprisingly glowing report about Hangzhou’s naturalization policies towards migrants, from 2005. Hangzhou also has a fairly well developed ‘account prepayment’ regulatory system, whereby firms employing migrants must pre-furnish a bank account to automatically pay out to migrants in the event of financial difficulties for the firm.

Such wage payment schemes were first introduced in the Pearl River Delta. Mandating ‘reserve salary accounts’ for firms may discourage investment that might otherwise take place, since operating costs are higher (commensurate with however secure local officials want workers to be). This argument, however, ignores whatever path dependency the migrants themselves might be engaged in. To the extent that migrants count on having a particular job, there are certain sunk costs in travel and arranging their households while they are away, which most commonly means renting out whatever agricultural land they have. These sorts of commitments would seem to make short term transitions more difficult – if you’re pay is getting garnished, you could return home (and do nothing on your rented farm), or remain in the city hoping your garnished wages will come to you. If you’re laid off, better to find almost any job than return home to idle.

These costs are likely more significant when migrants come from a greater distance, as is the case in wealthier cities like Hangzhou and Shanghai, where labor needs are greater than the local populace can support. In Wuhan, the vast majority (87%) of migrant laborers come from within Hubei province, and many are seasonal rather than year round, and as such do not rent out their land, or if they do, do it for shorter terms (3-6 months) rather than a full year.*

Conjecture: it makes sense that more prosperous cities have more rigorous rules on wage prepayment schemes – the firms that are entering these areas are more likely to be able to afford it, and labor tends to be much less fluid insofar as it is more difficult for these migrants to find profitable means to return home.

The effectiveness of wage prepayment laws for firms employing migrants therefore would seem highly dependent upon the particular context, with special consideration for labor mobility in that area. To the extent they help, they provide a context wherein workers can be assured of wages, and thus better form long-term plans; but also introduce a barrier in the form of higher costs to firms seeking to employ them.

Whether these systems can be easily exported from 1st tier cities like Shanghai and Hangzhou to poorer, developing areas is a very relevant question, and one that (so far as I’m aware) there is sufficient, available data to address. More inquiry required.

* From 民权与民生：中国农民权益实证调查，一西安 ：西北大学出版社，2008.5 （中国农村调查书系）

My field research consists of recorded verbal interviews with migrant workers in Wuhan, and focuses on the relationship between national level policy reform with actual on-the-ground enforcement of these rules. So far results are inconclusive. Of particular interest are China’s recently implemented Rural Land Reforms and Labor Contract Law Reforms. The former, implemented at the beginning of the financial crisis, seeks to formalize de-facto land right usage arrangements that migrants use when moving into cities. My understanding is that the policy is little more than tacit acknowledgment of urbanization trends already well underway within China. The Labor Contract Reform Law, implemented at the beginning of 2008, seeks to provide numerous classes of workers with additional rights in the event of a labor dispute. Amid a worsening job situation, there is considerable anecdotal evidence that authorities are being told to look the other way during these disputes. 

The original research proposal sought to document case studies of employee-employer disputes, although thus far I have not had the opportunity to explore this issue given the sensitivity of such topics. Any advice for how / whom to approach would be appreciated. By the end of the grant, my hope is to be able to elucidate some of the interactions of these complex forces as they relate to China’s urbanization and demographic shifts. 

With regards to the latter, this Southern Weekly article (劳动合同法期待完善 ”Hopes for Perfecting Labor Contract Law”) describes how loopholes in China’s Labor Contract Law (implemented  Jan 1, 2008) are being exploited by “dispatch companies” (派遣公司 – essentially a large temp agency). These institutions can skirt many of the provisions of the new law, since (by the terms of the law) there exists no direct relationship between dispatch company employees and the main employer. If the problems get out of hand, the dispatch company can simply shut-down, and the original employer seek another such entity to provide labor.

The Labor Contract Law allows workers to seek legal redress for grievances against their employers, which had previously been much more difficult. This is most commonly pursued for delay or non-payment of salary, but also addresses numerous other worker rights issues. Chinalawblog has an excellent overview here and here. 

Prior to implementation, it was widely regarded that the new laws would increase labor costs, potentially making low-skill industries more expensive than other export dependent countries. This fit well with China’s long-term strategy: move up the value chain, a la Singapore. There was at the time, however, no acknowledgment of the financial crisis, and (especially in China) its potential effects on the “real” economy. From the Southern Weekly article: 

As of October 2008, upon being impacted by the international financial crisis, the woes of domestic enterprises continued to increase. Cases of employers delaying salary payments were even higher, as well as an increase in cases where employers failed to meet their contributions to social security payments. In some areas, there have even been instances of enterprises shutting down, and their bosses [illegally] fleeing elsewhere. Instances of labor disputes have increased rapidly.

Perfection of [the problematic] legal clauses is imminent, but this economic winter has caused policy makers to be filled with misgivings [about further reforms].

2008年10月份以来，受国际金融危机影响，国内企业经营困难加剧，企业欠薪情况增多，企业足额缴纳社会保险费的难度加大，有的地方还发生企业主欠薪逃匿事件，劳动争议案件大幅上升。

法律条款的完善迫在眉睫，但这个经济冬天的现实却让决策者畏首畏尾。

Simultaneous with efforts to close such loopholes, there are unofficial reports that officials are telling employers to ignore the more stringent aspects of the law (from Peter Ford, writer for the Christian Science Monitor in a Q&A at Danweivia Chinalawblog):

I have heard, though not been able to confirm, that provincial governments have been quietly telling employers for several months that if they do not abide by the provisions of the Labor Contract Law they need not worry, and this seems perfectly plausible.

A lot of employers have been complaining for a year or so that the labor law, along with the rising value of the RMB until last July, was a major factor in making them uncompetitive.

There is certainly a recursive relationship between reality and codification of the world that we might like – but the best laws are simply those that formalize informal relationships and agreements. Legislating the unenforceable leads directly to de facto non-compliance and exploitation of loopholes amid reform for rhetorical effect alone.

Again, nothing really new – this post from Freakonomics ‘Where Life Revolves Around Your Cellphone, the Factory Floor, and Forged Diplomas‘ features an interview with Leslie Chang, author of Factory Girls:

A major part of the curriculum involved how to lie your way through job interviews into an office position. This ultra-pragmatism is pervasive in Chinese society today; people are less concerned with abstract notions of right and wrong than with getting things done. In economic terms, this fosters a business climate in which companies copy each others’ products, steal employees and business plans, and compete ruthlessly over tiny profit margins. But with little trust or sense of long-term planning and investment, they find it hard to grow and develop their businesses.

This system also takes an emotional toll on individuals. Everyone I knew in Dongguan had stories of being cheated and robbed and lied to, and over and over people told me, “You can only rely on yourself.” But even though this is a world marked by corruption and deceit, it is at the same time highly functional. It just functions by its own set of rules.

And another migrant picture. These particular migrants (from elsewhere in Hubei) prepare a mean bowl of  delicious Wuhan specialty sesame sauce noodle:

In Marxist class yesterday my professor mentioned that ‘growth was slowing – maybe even 7%’ and ‘now is a very difficult time to find jobs for [university] graduates.’ A furious discussion immediately broke out, with students attempting to correct him that ‘growth would be at least 9%! It was in the papers this morning!’

The very same students earlier admitted that ‘most of the newspapers here are just tabloids.’ Still – the process of mutual delusion is important to security. Even more ominously, the very same paper also features a short story (‘Supporting Migrant Workers Job Search after returning Home’) on how the number of reverse-migrants is increasing rapidly in cities like Wuhan, and it’s become a priority to help them find meaningful employment in the countryside. According to the article, 20,000 migrants have already left Wuhan. Here’s a Wall Street Journal article on the same topic (China Fears Restive Migrants as Jobs Disappear in Cities):

Between 80 million and 100 million rural residents are either completely landless or don’t have access to enough land for subsistence, estimates Joshua Muldavin, professor of geography and Asian studies at Sarah Lawrence College. “The increases right now with the large-scale return of peasants could add tens of millions to that,” he says. “Its importance can’t be exaggerated in China and internationally.”

Link from Baseline Scenario, which also features a good roundup of information on general topic of China’s decline.

… most people believe official urban employment rate significantly understates real urban unemployment, and the real level could be as high as 10-11%… The key to social stability is adequate employment growth.  That growth either has to be fueled by maintaining exports, or increasing domestic consumption.  But there are important reasons why domestic consumption won’t increase.  For one, the lack of safety nets in health and elder care cause Chinese households to save in order to self-insure their risks for illness or health care emergencies.

So they’ll have to push more exports in any way possible; subsidies and currency seem the most likely – and might work, that is until hit with protectionist measures from the rest of the world. Real RMB depreciation is great for me – kegs of beer will remain at the appropriate price of $2.67. Of course, factors motivating this phenomena also mean that unemployment will increase; research becomes more complicated. Chinese are generally a jovial people, but poverty can motivate all sorts of undesirable behavior towards a walking white ATM: being mugged may well complicate my project, which consists of me wandering around talking to underemployed guys with power tools. 

This is of course despite ample amounts of rhetoric indicating that Beijing is intent upon ‘replacing foreign demand with domestic consumption. There are over a billion people here…’ with no absolutely discussion of how the process could actually occur – unsurprising, since Communist state media is only slightly more nuanced than cro-magnons like Bill O’Reilly and Lou Dobbs. There is so far little discussion of the ‘painful’ scenario – I become even more pessimistic.

Prof. Roubini argues that China will hit the “hard-landing” 5-6% growth scenario:

… a hard landing in the economy and in investment would lead to a sharp increase in non-performing loans of the – still mostly public – state banks; the implicit liabilities from a serious banking problem would then add to the implicit and explicit budget deficits and public debt. Note that the poor quality of the underwriting by Chinese banks – that financed a huge overinvestment in the economy – has been hidden for the last few years by the high growth of the economy. Once net exports go bust and real investment sharply falls we will see a massive surge in non-performing loans that financed low return and marginal investment projects. The ensuing fiscal costs of cleaning up the banking system could be really high.

And the comments on Roubini’s from the same post (Asia-Pacific Journal):

… the (likely) fall in construction is particularly worrisome. China’s new capital intensive export sectors haven’t been huge job generators. Building buildings by contrast employs lots of people – including a lot of migrants from rural areas.

Which puts even more pressure for China to push their China-bailout out the door as fast as possible. All of this will complicate any pretense about holding variables constant for field research, but also presents an opportunity to witness collapse / resilience first hand.

Well, turns out it doesn’t really work, and that rule of law is still developing. This may seem obvious; let’s remember that I’m both young and naive. The past month has been spent establishing contacts, finding spots to return to (for verbal interviews), and trying to assess the feasibility of gathering information about different aspects of migration and growth, broadly between: 1) development of institutions (labor disputes, primarily over garnished wages or industrial accidents); 2) rural land reform (as it encourages even more urbanization); and 3) impacts of population movements on ’soft’ infrastructure in cities (schools, hospitals, legal system). 

I’ll probably focus on the third for the time – it will afford a strong reason to volunteer at a migrant school. This has myriad benefits: not only can I fulfill my dream of being like Edward James Olmos*; I need to strengthen the warm and fuzzy portion of the resume now that they’re in charge. Furthermore, English is my only real skill, and I’ve heard it could make the difference for some migrants between a job as a laborer and a service person; so there’s a definite chance of some realized benefit.

Actually it’s just that it seems the most feasible. Legal issues are tricky; and it would be exhausting to get a large interview sample. The interviews I’ve been conducting thus far often touch on legal disputes; and the story is usually the same. The other thing I’ve been noticing is that it’s fairly easy to get descriptions about rural reforms from people already here. You hear something like this quite often:

Well, I’m renting my land illegally right now. I’m not quite sure what the reforms mean. You know people have been doing this for years, I don’t know what’s different. It doesn’t provide that much money – if it did, do you think I’d be be <insert awful sounding menial task> here?

It also happens that there’s dozens of other (much more qualified / intelligent) white people researching land reform in China. It’s a very crunchy topic. Number of westerners researching or advocating solutions to primary education policy in China? Zero, as far as I know.

So, land reform going to be ancillary insofar as it is intimately linked with urbanization. Instead I’m going to focus on reforms that might allow cities to deal with the increases in population resulting from urbanization. I don’t expect to find anything substantial (“do this, and it will solve all your problems”) but rather hope to learn something new and interesting about how these changes might impact the future. 

Anything else I should consider? Also; anyone know where to find English teaching material… Like vocab words and lessons? I’ll be needing those soon. Also suggestions for names of students – like Megatron and Led Zeppelin. Quality names.

… the planned stimulus does not attempt to boost public and private consumption. It aims, instead, to keep the economy ticking over until it can start exporting again. This will not work. This is the golden opportunity to redirect the pattern of growth towards consumption and away from the previous massive reliance on exports and investment.

Bolstering domestic demand has been rhetorically recognized as the objective of recent recent rural land reforms. At the very least, these will allow poor people to sign over their land for 40 years to a rapacious coal tycoons, and spend that chunk of money to support their move to the megacities. Decreases in exports have already impacted domestic migration patterns, given that a vast number of migrant laborers are employed in export industries - most of the rest are in construction, which is also threatening a similar downturn.

So why the focus on fiscal stimulus? I’ve argued the “culturally dependent elasticity” case before - Zhou-sixpack does not respond to price or income changes like your average Westerner. Though having enjoyed things like refrigeration and heating, most here are perfectly capable of getting by on less. As such, policy measures meant to increase domestic consumption are probably less effective than we’re used to thinking of them. If the fiscal stimulus was simply turned into a cash handout, most households would stick it directly into savings – spooked as they are about the slowing economy. 

Beijing would like to spend more on labor-intensive sectors, though keenly aware of the uncomfortable prospect of dropping money into a Keynesian black hole (欢迎你们华人加入我们的俱乐部.) As far as the boys in Zhongnanhai are concerned, however, this possibility pales in comparison to the threat posed by 1 billion+ irate citizens, many of whom own pitchforks.

What is a migrant worker? The vast majority are rural residents who have come to cities to search for work. The Chinese is somewhat more descriptive – 农民工 – “farmer-laborer.” This is a paper I wrote in 2005 regarding a short research project on a shopping mall construction site in Shanghai, it provides a fairly basic overview, as well as trends present at that time.

Basic facts: women are primarily employed in textile factories or service industries. Male migrant workers are largely employed in basic menial labor – the more fortunate have some capacity in a trade – the fellows below are advertising electrician and plumber services. There are approximately 200 million migrants in China, with the number increasing rapidly every year (5-10 million).

]]> http://www.stillgoingnative.com/2008/11/09/chinese-migrant-workers/feed/ 0 http://www.stillgoingnative.com/2008/09/23/disarmingchinas-population-bomb/ http://www.stillgoingnative.com/2008/09/23/disarmingchinas-population-bomb/#comments Tue, 23 Sep 2008 13:14:48 +0000 tony http://www.stillgoingnative.com/?p=575 China’s biggest roadblock for continued development is its unfavorable demographic situation – in my homeland there is a concern that as baby boomers retire, the amount of young people will be insufficient to support the nation’s burgeoning ponzi-scheme Social Security System. This of course has to do with unfavorable demographics, a glut of 40/50 year olds. An eerily similar narrative exists in China that has nothing to do with post-wartime sex, and everything to do with an artificially constricted population due to China’s one child policy (1979). As a result, China’s demographic woes (‘oldification’ - 老龄化) are considerably more serious than ours, albeit with a different time frame. 

Unless official statistics are lying – there is good reason to think so. Oft-criticized patricentric traditional values, and illegal births resulting therefrom may be this country’s [demographic] salvation. But first the official story:

• Under 15: 20.3% (2007)
• 15–29: 22.8% (2007)
• 30–44: 26.7% (2007)
• 45–59: 18.2% (2007)
• 60–74: 9.4% (2007)
• 75–84: 2.3% (2007)
• 85 and over: 0.3% (2007)

From the State Census. If one child were ended today, China 2040 would still have around 25% of the entire population over 65, assuming these measurements are correct. However, it’s widely known that One-Child has not been perfectly enforced. There are also legal channels for having more than one child –  a family needs to pay between 7,000 – 8,000Y as a ‘fine’ for a second child. A third child is even more expensive, at 10,000Y+.*

The migrant workers I’ve talked to (largely from places like Sichuan, Anhui, Hubei, or elsewhere in Heilongjiang) describe that ‘just about everyone at home has at least two children, lots of families have more.” They unsurprisingly indicate that this is especially the case if the first child is not a male – “many will keep having children until they have a boy.”**

Why the estimation discrepancies? Chinese census methodology relies on municipal and provincial governments for much of the data collection. Inflated demographics would indicate that the very same individuals have been doing a bad job enforcing the policy.*** Within China, it is widely known that local officials deflate the statistics, no one knows by how much.

International organizations like the World Bank put China’s fertility rate at 1.9 (avg. births per female). Using various types of sampling, they avoid biases associated with outright manipulation of statistics by local officials, but are likely influenced by a population that is accustomed to hiding excess children, or at least sensitive to the topic. The extent of this bias is unknown. 

What’s this mean? Since the misreported / miscounted portion is younger, and will primarily join China’s laboring class, estimates about China’s decreasing relative labor costs should be re-interpreted. There’s still a lot of slack left in China’s excess labor pool, and will be for some time (two+ decades?).  China is not entirely free from other serious problems, but our aprraisals of China’s immediate future as it relates to the labor force should be decidedly more optimistic than official reports would indicate. 

* Rural residents can expect to earn 1,000 – 2,000Y per year if they grow their own food and farm full time; or ~15,000 – 20,000Y if they migrate and work as laborers (though they need to buy their own food on this amount).

** This obviously isn’t news to most people. My own take is that in poorer areas, boys are indeed more remunerative than girls – labor being what it is. That is gradually changing with industrialization (textiles for export, for example, almost exclusively employ women). There’s also a very strong cultural reason – men are viewed as having an obligation to support their parents; women are not (they are however obligated to their husband’s parents). 

** Most districts have “Birth Control Policy” offices, where people are employed to monitor who’s giving birth. They also run programs to the effect that “daughters are okay – you should have daughters.”

Regardless, some more background on migrant workers: I found the following passage interesting (from 中国农民工题与社会保护, pp.13-14). The monthly wage for most migrant workers (in large cities) is ~1000RMB per month; I’ll post more detailed income statistics at a later point. The survey in question was conducted by the authors over a number of years, starting in the late 90s, and the most recent iteration has ~2,000 respondents. Translation is my own, original follows:

… with regards to [migrant workers'] relationships with locals, 31.2% [of survey respondent's] felt that they had been discriminated against by locals, 57% felt that they had experienced no discrimination, and 11.8% did not answer clearly. With regards to [migrant workers'] relations with local government, 16.3% described their interactions as “very good,” 54.2% described their interactions as “average,” 11.3% described their interactions a “bad,” and 11.2% felt their interactions were “very bad.” These responses indicate that relations between migrant workers, locals, and local governments are far from ideal. Only 1.4% of respondents indicated that they would first turn to local government for legal protection, pointing to the importance of migrant – local relations.

 

With regards to respondent’s subjective interpretation of their economic well being in host cities, 41.8% felt that they were “lower class,” 32.6% felt they were “lower middle class,” 23.7% felt they were “middle class,” 1.7% felt they were “upper middle class,” and only 0.2% felt they were “upper class.” With regards to their own interpretation of the economic condition relative to their original homes, 9.2% felt they were “lower class,” 19.7% felt they were “lower middle class,” 51.9% felt they were “middle class,” 14.9% felt they were “upper middle class,” and 4.35% felt they were “upper class.” These results point a large difference in subjective perceptions of relative economic standing before and after migration, though on average subjective perceptions of these differences are worse in host cities…

 

… 79.2% of respondents did not agree with the statement, “a major reason for social instability [crime] within cities can be attributed to the influx of migrant laborers.” 66.5% of respondents did not agree with the statement, “migrant laborers are less well-mannered than city residents.” 89.8% of respondents did not agree with the statement, “migrant laborers are taking jobs from city residents.” [Awkward translation:] Such responses point to major issues of self perception among migrant laborers.

 

。。。在于当地的关系方面，31.2%的人认为初务工过程中受到了当地人排挤，57%的人认为没有受到排挤，11.8%的人说不清楚。在于当地政府的关系方面，16.3%的人反映很好，54.2%的人反映一般，11.3%的人反映不好，7%的人反映很不好，11.2% 的人说不清楚。这两组指标反映了农民工当地居民及政府的关系并不理想，因此，当问到被调查对象遇到困难时，只有1.4%的人首先会想到向下当地政府求助。 在自我评价方面，被调查者认为自己在当地经济地位居于下层者占41.8%，居于中下层者占32.6%，居于中层者占23.7%，居于中上层者占1.7%， 居于上层者仅占0.2%；认为自己在家乡经济地位居于层者占9.2%，居于中下层者占19.7%，居于中层者占51.9%，居于中上层者占14.9，居于 上层者占4.35%，居于上层者占4.35%；这一组织表反映参照系不同，农民工对经济地位的自我评价差别很大，普遍认为在当地经济地位居于中下层，而在家乡经济地位则居于中上层于以上。。。

。。。79.2%的被调查不同意:“城市社会生活变差的主要原因是由农民工造成的”，66.5%的被调查者不同意”农民工素质比城市人差”，89.8%的被调查者不同意：“农民工强了城市人的饭碗“，这些指标反映了现在的农民工自尊，自重，平等意识在增强。

Nothing earth-shattering here; it’s just interesting that over half (of their survey respondents) felt they had experienced no discrimination at all. This doesn’t jive with anecdotal reports of extensive discrimination by city locals. Of course, migrants would say they aren’t taking jobs. The conversation, insofar as it exists, is very reminiscent of the U.S. immigration debates – “no one would want those jobs anyway, someone needs to be doing them…” There are also significant restrictions on population movement (between provinces, and between rural / urban areas), though the extent to which these are well-enforced is still unclear to me.