Dinner conversation with some young women from Chongqing, censorship comes up. Recently the government has been cracking down on all sorts of licentiousness. One of the ladies mentioned that she strongly supported these efforts (especially online cens0rship), since “yellow material can damage the development of young people, especially men.” This would, in turn, make it harder for her to find husband material later on. She continued, “especially foreign sites like Google have lots of yellow material.”

She is of course correct: it is easier to find scantily clad people on Google than on Baidu, though this is due to the efficiency of Google’s search algorithms vis-a-vis Baidu, not simply because it’s foreign, and all foreigners are smutty (though that’s a fairly prevalent meme as well).

I often struggle with making interesting, lasting friendships with ‘locals,’ who I (intolerantly) define as Chinese nationals who don’t speak English and and have no strong interest to learn about global affairs. Were I able to do so effectively, it would be possible to gather more information on a broader range of perspectives.

As a result, expats living here often suffer from a ‘foreign-friendly-exposure’ bias, even if the interactions are conducted in Mandarin, for the simple reason that people are interested in talking to us are much more likely to be politically liberal. The only instances of lasting relationships with a ‘genuine local’ I know of are where people are able to substitute very specific interests (like making out) in place of the cultural gap. Sort of depressing that there seems to be no middle ground.

Rather than engage in substantive discussion with locals, I often resort to Communist propaganda slogans from the 60s and 70s in an attempt to both utilize reductio ad absurdum argumentation techniques and practice Chinese. Perhaps I’m incapable of communicating sarcasm in Mandarin since this morning my office mate, a teacher turned fund analyst, gave me a book as a gift today titled 新帝国主义在中国 (New Imperialism in China) which came out in January. The book was written by Nationalist public intellectual (intellectual here being used in the Glenn Beck sense) Lang Xianping. There’s a section in the intro titled 美国到底在干什么 (What, after all, is America doing?) which concludes with:

I believe that after reading this book, readers will understand, imperialism has never really gone away; it has just been reincarnated in a new form. So, what should we do? Chairman Mao once said a very important guideline: when illusion is lost, prepare for struggle!

我相信在读完本书之后，给位读者会了解，帝国主义从来没有消失过，他们只是以不同的形态借尸还魂罢了。那么，我们该怎么办呢？毛主席的一句话非常具有指导意义：丢掉幻想，准备头争！

Will report again if I read it cover to cover, at this point the text seems to focus on various reasons why American financial hegemony is extremely harmful to Chinese interests. American conservatives often point out that China owns ~USD2tr of Treasury Debt; Chinese conservatives lament that the American Treasury has a printing press. American conservatives say that free trade has hollowed out the American working class; Chinese conservatives say that free trade has forced Chinese laborers to manufacture products in exchange for increasingly worth less pieces of paper.

Potentially as the result of developing a very niche skill set (asset management in the Chinese mainland), and a pseudo-familiarity with China in general, many media articles come off as either incorrect or under researched. Bank of China to Issue New Shares (Wall Street Journal) originally reported that Bank of China was issuing lots of bonds to increase its capital, which had been depleted by lots of lending. This was true, though the original article missed that it was a simultaneous bond and stock issue, and that the bonds were convertible. The article was later edited, though I cannot imagine a similar omission being made with regards to, say, Morgan Stanley. This distinction between bond/convertible bond is significant insofar as mainland fixed-income markets are not very well developed by global standards, and a move by such a large player is important for anyone who cares about the depth of China’s financial markets (which relates to global imbalances caused by high savings rates). The alternative explanations in these cases: I simply misread the Chinese, or the world has suddenly turned into an interactive Kafka novel.

Even the NYT’s reporting on China often seems anecdotal at best, though certainly the quality of the work the publication delivers, given time and resource constraints, is impressive. However, every month or so there’s an article about Americans working in China, the latest of which concluded that ‘in some workplaces there are conflicts. If they happen while Americans are working in China, they must be due to cultural conflicts because China is strange and different.’ The article came off as under-researched, and played up broader narratives for the sake of mass appeal, such as when the author notes that “Chinese workers have a deeper understanding of the influences, like Confucianism and Communism, that play a part in their country’s culture and economy.” Sure these two systems existed at different points throughout Chinese history but they aren’t particularly relevant modes of discourse at present. It comes off as crass as writing “France’s Catholic history, a religious system that stresses a particular combination of guilt inducing mechanisms and flagellant self-sacrifice, has made the nation particularly amiable to the demands of the modern welfare state, unlike its Protestant neighbors.”

As for myself, I tend to have many more genuine cultural conflicts with people from the east coast of the US – they are tall and mean – whereas urban Chinese are polite and fun to talk to.

Seriously how is the above plot different from any given week here. I haven’t seen Avatar, nor do I really want to (preferring to convince myself that I’m able to lord some sort of indie-film-hipster sensibility over the easily entertained masses of humanity… it’s also hard to get a ticket). The film is a big deal here, and many have commented extensively on mainland interpretations of the film as an easily celebrated allegory for eminent domain, which seems like a fairly Sinocentric reading. Recently, the 2D version of the film was pulled to make way for the domestic epic, Confucius, which makes perfect sense since both films are science fiction/fantasy.

Ancient philosophers meh: Hunan claims to have mist-covered picturesque mountains similar to those featured in Avatar (English here), using the resemblance to draw tourists. The city of Zhangjiajie has renamed even named a local peak Avatar Hallelujah Mountain, the first two terms being phonetic transliterations (阿凡达哈利路亚, Afanda Haliluya) which just seems sort of wrong, though not quite Starbucks in the Forbidden City wrong. Popular culture will of course be interpreted in a local context, and instead of assimilation one should view these things as fusion. Perhaps we only wish the interpretations weren’t so crass. HT Ellie.

“Free flow of information is a prerequisite to participation in the global information economy.” Though I agree, I still try to find reasons to object, such that the inner-contrarian might be rationalized into submission. A basic argument: the U.S. and Europe made it through the industrial revolution without mass deployment of information technology. If modern China can get even halfway there, the country will eventually find itself on top, purely by the multiply-anything-by-1.4-billion characteristic.

Aside from that, it’s interesting to ponder how free-flow of information could be detrimental to democratic civil society or economic development. My underlying argument: if the costs of propagating information fall to near zero, information of any quality can be spread rapidly. Without an effective filter, finding accurate information quickly becomes impossible. Thus far the filters have managed to stay on top: effective search algorithms, aggregation sites and trend analytics. The rewards for creating friendly filters have outpaced the rewards for creating malicious propagation tools.

This hypothetical situation, where malicious (user generated) information outpaces efforts to filter, exists to a much larger extent within of the online-Sinosphere. It’s much easier to get lost in the noise and I cannot figure out if this is the result of

• a more open micro-system (users much more willing to trust and interact with complete strangers)
• a more closed meta-system (cens0ring certain information centralizes users’ preferences)

or the more mundane

• sophisticated noise is attributable entirely to very inexpensive labor (it’s very cheap to hire lots of people to say whatever you want them to). If the cost of doing this drops throughout the rest of the world (pseudo AI + spambot), it will result in a similar situation to the status quo here:

Maria writes of how online campaigns hire mass numbers of people to comment on certain topics, in order to draw attention to something that would otherwise go unnoticed. It’s possible, for example, to sell your account on Taobao (E-Bay) if you have a long history and positive customer reviews. As a result, customer reviews are rendered much less useful. This type of gaming occurs elsewhere, though not to this magnitude. In China, the prices of conducting such manipulation aren’t, at present, particularly high, especially with regard to the rewards that can be gained. She concludes that since the threat of media manipulation / meme engineering in this fashion is so easy, independent sources are an absolute necessity. To those in the West, that might sound outlandish: surely the collective voice of reason would drown out obvious forms of manipulation.

This argument sounds like the concerns that were circulating a decade ago about how online life would be overrun by spam mail. Instead, the online experience in the West is much more pleasant and accessible now than ever before, thanks in large part to technical advances, many of which have been motivated by commerce. This may not be the case indefinitely, and those who hope to see democratic values spread by technology should focus on making adoption of these technologies inseparable with information freedom, while developing cheap ways to filter noise: keep the rewards for filtering greater than the possible gains from manipulation. On a positive note, that seems to be the trend (Twitter being a wonderful example so far).

Other possibilities: susceptibility to manipulation could stem from a closed meta-system, where cens0rs force users into larger, less robust portals with little commercial interest in filtering sophisticated noise (Sina, Tianya), thus centralizing the rewards that a malicious manipulator can exploit. This seems the most likely explanation.

The Chinese-speaking internet may also be more susceptible to these types of manipulation simply given user habits, which may stem from culture, or be a response to a closed meta-system (probably both). Chinese internet users are much more social than those in the West. Insofar as I understand it, most Western users deploy social media to examine their own profiles and post humorous / narcissistic status updates for others to comment on; and generally don’t venture much beyond their immediate circle of real-life friends. Chinese users, on the other hand, are much more social within their networks – more willing to friend strangers and find similar interest groups that they actually participate with – than are Westerners. My own habits, and those of my close Western friends, seem much more quotidian and insular, and less likely to participate in large open groups, and so there are fewer forums for explicit manipulation.

At present, China provides a very interesting case study, and the influence of each of these factors deserves much more attention than it’s been receiving, rather than simply writing off the Great-Firewalled Mainland intranet as a lost cause while trumpeting the total and inevitable success of information freedom. Understanding the sources of this resilience should be a focal point of the information freedom debate, rather than just assuming that such resilience is inherent to unmitigated information flow. Resilience probably is inherent; though better safe than sorry.

With regards to the bigger picture, it is deeply concerning how a lack of competition (without the likes of Twitter or open search engines) will manifest and deprive millions of people the capacity to choose between alternative information regimes. Fallows notes an argument that China’s segmentation of its intranet is similar to the Protestant/Catholic printing-press-schism that occurred hundreds of years ago. Protestant nations developed much more quickly since laboring classes became literate; their Catholic counterparts fell behind:

“Innovation by the “out group” based on access to the benefits of the new information technology that creates new sources of wealth and power. I would conclude, therefore, that China, having made Spain’s decision to control information, is now out of the running for world leadership.”

* The incredible image at the top of the post comes from Chris Harrison (with a very nice series of other visualizations) about the interconnectedness of the world’s information networks.

It’s difficult to digest everything that’s going on right now, particularly for someone who views nearly every event and personal interaction through a game theoretic Machiavellian lens. More information is required. So, brain dump. The relative silence of the Chinese government, rapid involvement of official organs of the U.S. government, and brazen tone of the original post seems to point to more damaging information about the attacks that has yet to be revealed. The downside risks of a nation-nation standoff on this issue seem to be much more significant than any possible gains. These U.S. state organs are run by intelligent people and wouldn’t become involved if there wasn’t something more serious than what’s already been publicized; potentially as yet unrevealed egregious details of the espionage that was conducted.

Consider also: Google is certainly not failing in China, and the notion is an exceptionally stupid explanation that plays directly into the simpering / entirely ignorant posture that multinationals seem to adopt when they consider the China market. The move may not be as costly as a lot of people seem to be suggesting. For the foreseeable future, China isn’t going to account for a large segment of the online ad market. In a decade that will change, though in ten years Google might develop a pseudo-intelligent-do-everything algorithm. The tables won’t turn but neither China nor IT broadly will develop in a vacuum. Significant changes could still occur.

This is a paradigm shift, regardless of what information we haven’t heard yet. A decade ago, the inevitable future plutocracy was supposed to oppress my rights and take advantage of people; yet here is a multinational doing what no nation state has been willing to do: take a decidedly scorched earth stance against the CCP. From Ultimi Barbarorum:

I was surprised that several Shanghai-based European VCs and businessmen I follow on Twitter were among the cynics, berating Google for not conforming to Chinese/Asian business practices based on saving face, consensus and relationship-building, instead reverting to an “American” ultimatum. But these views come from individuals who have already made their peace with China’s political system, and whose business models and reputation do not depend on the unfettered flow of information. Perhaps some of them are unwittingly using the occasion to signal their own reliability as partners in China: “Look at us — we’d never consider doing what Google just did.” Google may have burned its financial bridges, but they are burning their moral bridges, making them the Stupid Cartesians of this sorry episode, Baruch.

Other good readings here (Fallows):

… What happens after Google is so roundly cheered for taking so clear a stand? China will still be there; many of its people will hunger for outside information and most will aspire to modernization… The next step is to find some way to reduce the number of losses — including, yes, for the Chinese government, since (believe me) absolutely no good will come to anyone anywhere from the government’s feeling shamed, humiliated, or newly insecure. It is emotionally satisfying to see the Chinese government thrown off balance after its recent repressive moves. That won’t make things better for most people in China.

and here (Jay Ogilvy, via China Digital Times).

If information becomes more difficult to access, are people willing to go to greater lengths to obtain it? There is considerable worry among the literati within China that Google’s almost certain departure solidifies China’s intranet, siloed off from the rest of the world. In my mind this would be one of the worst possible outcomes, in terms of a broad human rights / freedom of information perspective. With this in mind, arguably the most socially responsible course of action would be for Google to remain in China, and provide the best information possible within the context of universal cens0rship (so long as employees aren’t being arrested and interrogated and the operation doesn’t jeopardize normal security efforts).

There would, however, seem to be some possibility that if information becomes more difficult to access, then necessarily the willingness to expend effort and resources would increase, assuming no endogenous change in the information preferences of actors within the system. Within this context, a small increase in the amount of effort above the threshold to evade the GFW provides access to a huge amount of information. The net result in such a scenario is that if more effort is expended, much more information can be accessed. It’s a big assumption, though: as effort required to access information increases, however, so too might some individuals decrease their information preferences to hold effort constant.

That seems to be the most critical question (from a social standpoint) of the entire debacle. If more Chinese internet users realize they are being segmented and learn how to evade the GFW, they then have much more access to the global internet, which is a positive outcome. If, however, the segment of internet users that doesn’t evade the GFW remains constant, then (at least 33% of them) will have even even more limited access. Both trends will occur in tandem; a positive or negative result will depend on the relative strength of each and the individual information preferences of those within the affected group: those who are marginally interested in more information but haven’t yet developed a method to evade the firewall.