I’ve been trying to take advantage of free time afforded by the holidays to do more recorded interviews; before all of the migrants go home for the Spring Festival – not quite sure what I’ll do for those three weeks. Many migrants report that the past few months have witnessed average incomes decline by about 2/3 (across all categories of employment my limited sample covers). Apparently a lot of the large concentrations I’ve been seeing is seasonal – many who have full-time jobs will also work part time as hourly laborers in an effort to earn money prior to returning home in January / February. That being said, most people interviewed also acknowledge that there are simply more migrants out than usual. 

Again, nothing really new – this post from Freakonomics ‘Where Life Revolves Around Your Cellphone, the Factory Floor, and Forged Diplomas‘ features an interview with Leslie Chang, author of Factory Girls:

A major part of the curriculum involved how to lie your way through job interviews into an office position. This ultra-pragmatism is pervasive in Chinese society today; people are less concerned with abstract notions of right and wrong than with getting things done. In economic terms, this fosters a business climate in which companies copy each others’ products, steal employees and business plans, and compete ruthlessly over tiny profit margins. But with little trust or sense of long-term planning and investment, they find it hard to grow and develop their businesses.

This system also takes an emotional toll on individuals. Everyone I knew in Dongguan had stories of being cheated and robbed and lied to, and over and over people told me, “You can only rely on yourself.” But even though this is a world marked by corruption and deceit, it is at the same time highly functional. It just functions by its own set of rules.

And another migrant picture. These particular migrants (from elsewhere in Hubei) prepare a mean bowl of  delicious Wuhan specialty sesame sauce noodle:

This picture was taken yesterday, after I noticed that there were about three times as many migrants clustering on the corner looking for work. I struck up a conversation with one and started a recorded interview, which quickly turned into a recorded interview with ten. They explained that their average monthly incomes had dropped from 2,000 – 3,000Y to 1,000 – 1,500Y; as a result of the economic crisis, and that many planned to go home soon though described they weren’t yet very sure what they would do – “I don’t know how to farm; I’ve been doing this [renovation] since I was 16.” They seemed rather jovial given the circumstances.

This is new also – a guy who has set up four Xiangqi boards with various asymmetrical scenarios (like starting the game using only half of the pieces, or something else absurdly difficult). He challenges would be customers to beat him. He’s also playing a game of poker on the side.

The original proposal for my grant was to ‘investigate mechanisms in place for dispute resolution in extralegal contexts. The lack of enforceable property regimes in China would seem to stand in staunch opposition to prevailing growth theories that emphasize institutional stability and rule of law.’

Well, turns out it doesn’t really work, and that rule of law is still developing. This may seem obvious; let’s remember that I’m both young and naive. The past month has been spent establishing contacts, finding spots to return to (for verbal interviews), and trying to assess the feasibility of gathering information about different aspects of migration and growth, broadly between: 1) development of institutions (labor disputes, primarily over garnished wages or industrial accidents); 2) rural land reform (as it encourages even more urbanization); and 3) impacts of population movements on ’soft’ infrastructure in cities (schools, hospitals, legal system). 

I’ll probably focus on the third for the time – it will afford a strong reason to volunteer at a migrant school. This has myriad benefits: not only can I fulfill my dream of being like Edward James Olmos*; I need to strengthen the warm and fuzzy portion of the resume now that they’re in charge. Furthermore, English is my only real skill, and I’ve heard it could make the difference for some migrants between a job as a laborer and a service person; so there’s a definite chance of some realized benefit.

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It’s a bit of a literal translation – ‘they’re taking our jobs’ is perhaps more colloquial. “Rice bowl” in this case means source of sustenance, as in the Communist ‘iron rice bowl’ (铁饭碗) which refers to the absolute standard of living assured by the munificence of a planned economy.

Regardless, some more background on migrant workers: I found the following passage interesting (from 中国农民工题与社会保护, pp.13-14). The monthly wage for most migrant workers (in large cities) is ~1000RMB per month; I’ll post more detailed income statistics at a later point. The survey in question was conducted by the authors over a number of years, starting in the late 90s, and the most recent iteration has ~2,000 respondents. Translation is my own, original follows:

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My Fulbright Research topic was generically outlined as: “causes and consequences of rural to urban migration in central China.” This is a massive topic, and I still hope to narrow the final iteration. I’ve begun background research, and will begun to utilize this website as initially intended – a forum for posting thoughts as a record, and seeking out advice as I proceed.*

At this point, my hope is to examine how information (regarding predation) is exchanged among migrant workers, since they are subject to an asymmetry problem (work-gang bosses know far more about their work contracts than they do). If this is in fact the case, is there a low-cost way to propertize information to allow for more rapid exchange? Would doing so speed growth in regions / cities that enacted such policies? If so, someone who could forecast it could get very rich.

China at present has approximately 130 million migrant workers,** defined as ‘laborers who move from rural areas to [relatively] industrialized areas in order to work’ [this includes more industrialized, other rural areas.] China is adding 5m – 8million people to this pool every year, a rate that is growing. By 2018 most estimates put the entire migrant laborer population at 210 million people. That’s about 60% of the U.S. population, entirely as a mobile (and relatively adaptable) labor force.

I’m therefore wondering how empirically analyze labor mobility in municipal level growth – it’s possible to look at ‘number of residential permits awarded,’ but that number is obviously linked to other sources of growth, in that it would also represent a demand for labor. Regardless, if some link could be conclusively demonstrated it would serve as an excellent starting point for more directed qualitative work.

* self aggrandizing photo posts will likely continue.

** from 中国农民工问题与社会把护 (Rural-Urban Migrant Workers in China – Issues, Social, and Legal Protection).